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ASSOCIATES O F OBSTETRICS and 
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BRIEF O F APPELLANT ON REMAND 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Pur suan t to the mandate of the Supreme Court of 
the United States , th is m a t t e r has been remanded for a 
determinat ion of whether appellant, National Bank of North 
A m e r i c a i s entitled to a s s e r t i t s r ight , pursuant to Section 
94 of Ti t le 12 of the United States Code to have this case 
t r i ed in the E a s t e r n Dis t r i c t of New York o r the Supreme 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Court for Queens County, New York or whether respondent 
has sustained its burden of proving a waiver of that 
right. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This action was commenced in the Third Judicial 
District in and for Salt Lake County, Utah by the 
Associates of Obstetrics and Female Surgery, Inc. (here-
inafter "Associates") claiming that Appellant, National 
Bank of North America (hereinafter the nBankn) had breached 
an implied fiduciary responsibility. * The Bank made a 
Motion to Dismiss the Complaint because, under the pro-
visions of Section 94 of Title 12, U. S. C. , venue of this 
action as against it as a national banking association did 
not lie in the forum in which Associates commenced this 
action. The District Court granted the Motion with leave 
to amend. Associates amended its Complaint and the Bank 
again filed a Motion to Dismiss on the same grounds. After 
a lengthy continuance of the matter and change of counsel, 
the District Court denied the Motion. 
*The action arose out of a loan made by plaintiff to Apollo 
Productions, Inc. , the payment of which was guarantied by 
the individual defendants. Ail of these defendants have 
defaulted in this action. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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On November 21, 1975, this Court affirmed the 
decision below. By order dated April 26, 1976, the Supreme 
Court of the United States reversed and remanded the 
case for a determination of whether the Bank had waived its 
right to answer the protection afforded by the federal statute, tr t 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
On this hearing the Bank seeks an order that Associates 
have not shown a waiver of the provisions of 12 U. S. C. 94 
and pursuant to United States Supreme Court opinion requests 
this Court to grant the Bank's Motion to Dismiss. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In June of 1972, Associates commenced this action seeking 
to recover damages from the Bank and certain individuals arising out 
of a loan which Respondent made to Apollo Productions, Inc. ("Pro-
ductions"). Associates served the Bank at its office at 44 Wall Street, 
New York, New York, on July 5, 1972 (R-204). 
The Bank appeared for the limited purpose of 
challenging the jurisdiction of the Utah courts and moved 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
to dismiss the action as against it (R -170). Noting that it was 
a national banking association with its prinicpal place of business 
in the County of Queens, State of New York, the Bank relied 
on the provisions of 12 U. S. C. 94 which states: 
!,Actions and proceedings against any 
association under this chapter may be 
had in any district or terr i tor ial court 
of the United States held within the 
district in which such association may 
be established, or in any state, county, 
or minicipal court in the county or city 
in which said association is located 
having jurisdiction in similar cases. n 
In opposing that Motion, Associates alleged that the 
Bank had waived its right to asser t the protection of the 
statute (R-15 9). It based its position on a telegram sent 
by the Bank from New York to Paul Naisbitt, in Utah (R-167) 
and on an involuntary petition in bankruptcy filed by the 
Bank in the United States District Court against Apollo Corporation--
which is not a party to this litigation. With these contentions before 
it, the District Court granted the Bank's Motion to Dismiss (R-106). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
Subsequently, Associates filed an Amended 
Complaint (R-104) in which all of the allegations of the 
original defective complaint were incorporated. The sole 
difference was that Associates asserted in its pleading 
that the acts alleged above constituted a waiver of the 
statutory privilege. 
The Bank again filed a Motion to Dismiss 
challenging the jurisdiction (R-79) under 12 U. S.C. 94. In 
its supporting papers, the Bank pointed out that it had no 
offices or agents in Utah, that it did no business in the 
State of Utah, that it was not qualified to do business 
in Utah and that it herefore could not be held to have 
waived its privilege. 
Nonetheless, the Motion to Dismiss the Amended 
Complaint was denied (R-18). On appeal, this Court 
affirmed the decision of the District Court holding that the 
provisions of 12 U. S. C. 94 were permissive and inapplicable. 
In its Order, this Court did not reach the issue of waiver. 
The Bank petitioned the Supreme Court of the 
United States for a writ of cert iorari and in a per curiam 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
opinion dated April 26, 1976, the writ was granted. The 
Supreme Court held that Section 94 was mandatory and that 
a national bank may only be sued in a court in the county 
where it is located. The Court went on to hold: 
"Accordingly, we grant the petition 
for cer t iorar i and vacate the judgment 
of the Utah Supreme Court. Since that 
court did not reach the respondents 
contention that the petitioner had 
waived the provisions of § 94, the case 
is remanded for a determination of that 
i s sue . " (footnote omitted). 
This hearing is being held pursuant to that mandate. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT I 
THE BANK HAS NOT WAIVED ITS 
RIGHT TO ASSERT THE PRIVILEGE 
UNDER 12 U. S. C. 94 
The standard by which a claim of waiver must be measured 
was set forth in Buffum v. Chase National Bank, 192 F . 2d 58, 60-61 
(7th Cir. 1951) where the Court said: 
"Waiver is a voluntary and intentional 
relinquishment or abandonment of a 
known existing right or privilege, 
which, except for such waiver, would 
have been enjoyed. 67 C.J . 289. It 
may be expressed formally or it may be 
implied as a necessary consequence of 
the waiver fs conduct inconsistent with 
an assertion of retention of the right. 
It must be proved by the party relying 
upon it. And if the only proof of 
intention to waive res ts on what a party ** °f 
does or forbears to do, his act or 
omissions to act should be so manifestly 
consistent with and indicative of an 
intent to relinquish voluntarily a 
particular right that no other reasonable 
explanation of his conduct is possible. 
67 C.J . 311 and cases there cited.,f 
See also: Northside Iron and Metal Company, Inc. v. Dobson and 
Johnson, Inc. 480 F. 2d 798 (5th Cir. 1973); United States National 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Bank v. Hill, 434 F. 2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1970).* 
In its attempt to meet its burden of establishing 
waiver, Associates can point to only three incidents. 
A. On November 23, 1971, the Bank filed an 
involuntary petition in bankruptcy in the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah, Central Division 
against Apollo Corporation (R-144). Apollo Corporation is 
not a party to this action. 
B. On January 12, 1971, the Bank sent a 
telegram to Paul Naisbitt (R-167). 
"•'Although the decision in this case is governed by federal 
law, it is clear that similar principles would be applied 
under state law. In American Savings & Loan Association v. 
Biomquist, 21 Utah 2d 289, 445 P . 2d 1, 3 (1968) this Court, 
quoting from Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Heath, 90 Utah 187, 
P . 2d 308 (1968) said: 
n
. . .A waiver is the intentional relin-
quishment of a known right. To constitute 
a waiver, there must be an existing right, 
benefit, or advantage, a knowledge of its 
existence, and an intention to relinquish 
it. It must be distinctly made, although 
it may be express or implied. n 
See also: Reed v. Union Central Life Ins. Co. , 21 Utah 295 
61 Pac. 21 (1900); In re Auerbach's Estate, 23 Utah 529, 
65 Pac. 488 (1901). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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C. An alleged telephone conference call on 
January 11, 1971 with Associates, Productions and the Bank in 
which the parties discussed purported arrangements that could 
be made regarding collateral held by the Bank in New York. 
(R-224-225). — 
As shall be hereinafter demonstrated, this meagre 
showing is insufficient. For in those few cases where 
waiver has been found, the courts have required proof of 
an intensive and continuous course of dealing by the 
bank within the forum jurisdiction. Evidence of such 
activity is wholly lacking here .* 
Thus, in Reaves v. Bank of America, 352 F . Supp. 
745 (S.D. Cal. 1973), the Bank had 66 branches in the 
forum jurisdiction through which it carried on a diverse 
banking business. The bank had instituted 105 suits in 
that jurisdiction and had been sued without objection, on 
*In its prior brief, Associates inferred that the Bank has 
obtained a security interest in Productions1 assets located 
in Utah. However, the record does not support such a claim. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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338 occasions. In addition the Bank had perfected its sec-
urity interest in that jurisdiction, had resorted to local 
law to protect that interest and had reinforced its 
position by resorting to self-help within the forum. 
The Court, viewing the totality of the bank's 
activities declared at p. 750: 
11
 Taken together with the defendant's 
extensive activities in this district, 
plus the fact that all transactions 
herein involved occurred in this 
district, the defendant's previous 
failure to object to being sued in 
this district is inconsistent with 
its claim that it is not present for 
venue purposes. Its contacts with this 
district are much more than minimal. 
Further, its conduct warrants a strong 
inference of the relinquishment of a 
known right, the right to invoke the 
benefits of §94 ." 
In Michigan National Bank v. Superior Court, County of 
Contra Costa, 23 Cal. App. 3d 1, 99 Cal. Rep. 823 (1972) the bank 
solicited customers in California, financed purchases of planes 
located in California, took security interest under California law 
and apparently repossessed those planes with California. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Court, in finding a waiver said: 
nThe foregoing precedents indicate 
that if the national bank seeks to use 
a state court, other than in the 
county or city in which it is located, 
to enforce obligations which a re due it, 
it may be subject to counter suit for 
matters arising out of that t ransac t ion^ ;u 
This suggests that when self-help is used 
for the same purpose, claims arising out 
of the assertion of the bank's rights 
should be heard where they occur. 23 Cal. 
App. 3d at 11, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 830. " 
In Buffum v. Chase National Bank, supra, the 
bank qualified with the Illinois regulatory authorities to 
do a trust business in that state, opened an office, 
accepted trust deposits and appointed an agent for the 
receipt of process in connection with that business. The 
Court found that the bank had only waived its privilege with 
respect to the trust aspect of its business stating, at 
p. 61. 
"We are of the further opinion that 
defendant, by its acts, evinced no 
intention to waive in its entirety the 
privilege it had under the laws of being 
sued only in New York. We can not 
atribute to it an intent to waive any-
thing other than what it did actually 
waive in consenting to be sued in Illinois 
in connection with trust business t rans- ,
 4 
acted in that state. " 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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In Gregor J. Schaefer Sons, Inc. v. Watson, 26 
A.D. 2d 659, 272 N. Y. S. 2d 790 (2nd Dept. 1966), the Court 
listed a series of factors which would be germane to 
determining whether there had been a waiver of the 
privilege. Included in that list were: 
Whether the bank had a branch office in 
the forum; 
Whether the bank had consented to service 
of process in the forum; 
Whether the bank held itself out to the 
public as doing business in the forum; 
Whether the bank's charter* indicates that 
it is npresentn in the forum; 
Whether the bank, in the transaction in 
issue, committed itself to perform any acts within the 
forum. 
The record in this case demonstrates that all 
of these questions must be answered in the negative. 
*The charter of the Bank in this case appears at pp. 173 
et seq. of the record. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Indeed, Associates cannot show that any of the factors which 
induced the Courts in Reaves, Michigan National or Buffum 
to find a waiver a re present here. To the contrary, 
Associates can only point to the bankruptcy petition, 
the telegram and the telephone call as support for its * ^ 
claim. As shall be seen, these sparse contacts are not 
sufficient, for courts have consistently refused to find 
a waiver of the privilege--even where the degree of 
activity in the forum was far greater . 
Thus in Northside Iron and Metal Company, Inc. v. 
Dobson and Johnson, Inc. , 480 F . 2d 798, 800 (5th Cir. 1973), 
the Court held: 
nMerely doing business in a foreign _
 ?^( 
district even through a branch bank 
or a wholly owned subsidiary located 
there, does not constitute a waiver 
of the privilege. " (Citing cases) 
See also: Firs t National Bank of Boston v. United States 
District Court, 468 F . 2d 180 (9th Cir. 1972); United States 
Bank v. Hill, 434 F . 2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1970); Rome v. Eltra 
Corp. , 297 F . Supp. 314 (E. D. Pa. 1969); Gregor Schaefer 
Sons, Inc. v. Watson, s.upra. 
In Heico, Inc. v. Fi rs t National City Bank, 470 F. 2d 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
883 (3rd Cir. 1972), the Bank had established two branch 
offices in the Virgin Islands and had engaged in a general 
banking business. In addition, the bank had commenced 
two litigations in the local courts seeking to enforce 
its rights against Virgin Island residents. The Court 
of Appeals held that these activities did not manifest an 
intent to waiver the statute. 
Similarly, in Sulil v. Rye Motors, 45 Misc. 2d 458, 
257 N.Y.S. 2d 111 (West Co.) affd 47 Misc. 2d 715, 262 N.Y.S. 
2d 989 (App. T. 2nd Dept. 1965), the Court held: 
"We are also of the opinion that the 
invoking by respondent bank of the jur i s -
diction of this court in other unrelated 
actions does not constitute a waiver of 
its exemption and a general submission to 
this court1 s jurisdiction in respect of 
the instant proceedings to enforce the 
money judgments recovered by the plaintiffs 
in wholly unrelated actions. "* 
In this regard, it is appropriate to note that 
the filing of the involuntary petition against Apollo 
Corporation in the United States District Court is hardly 
deserving of the significance which Associates attaches 
thereto. The Bank had no discretion as to where to file 
*See also: Durabuilt Steel Locker Co. v. Berger Mfg. Co. , 
21 F.2d 139 (N.D. Ohio, 1927); Austin v. Austin, 171 Ga. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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for venue of such proceedings was at the time prescribed in 
Section 2a of the Bankruptcy Act. * 
In addition, the Bank did not attempt to enforce 
any rights under Utah state law in that proceeding. 
Rather, it availed itself of its rights under the Bankruptcy i - . ^ * ,.,* 
Act—which would not be inconsistent with its right to 
asser t the venue privilege herein. Tanglewood Mall, Inc. v. 
Chase Manhattan Bank, 371 F . Supp. 722 (W. D. Va. ) afffd 508 
F . 2d 838 (4th Ci r . ) cert, denied. 421 U.S. 965 (1975). 
Nor is this singular act, when coupled with the 
Bank's participation in a telephone-call and the sending 
of a telegram "so manifestly consistent with and 
indicative of" a waiver of the Bank's rights under 12 
• • • < • " 
U. S.C. 94 "that no other reasonable explanation. . . is 
possible. " Buffum v. Chase National Bank, supra. After 
*In Nevada National Bank v. The Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County, App. 119 Cal. Rptr. 778, 45 Cal. App. 3rd 966 
(1975), one Bogart borrowed money from a Nevada bank and 
granted the bank a security interestrin a car which interest was 
perfected in Nevada. Bogart moved the car to California and 
defaulted on his loan whereupon the Bank repossessed the car in 
California. 
Finding that "the Bank had no choice" as to where it could 
repossess the car, the Court concluded: 
"in short, we can find in the record no voluntary 
act of the bank in California that was not nnmnnii-j 
b v the* r»/^^~'—-*x* Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
all, if the opening of a branch office, which entails the 
maintenance of a physical facility, the presence of 
personnel, the acceptance of deposits and extensions of 
credit--ai l on a daily bas i s - - i s insufficient to manifest 
an intent to waiver, then the isolated transactions upon 
which Associates bases its claim are equally deficient. * 
In the final analysis then, there is no basis 
in fact or law to support Associates1 claim that National 
Bank of North America waived its right to avail itself of 
the provisions of 12 U. S. C. 94. 
*In point of fact, the actions on which Associates predicates 
its claim are , wholly apart from 12 U.S. C. 94, insufficient 
to subject the Bank to the jurisdiction of the Utah Courts, 
Hill v. Zale Corp. , 25 Utah 2d 357, 482 P . 2d 332 (1971); 
Conn v. Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d 250, 342 P . 2d 871 (1959); 
Western Gas Appliances, Inc. v. Servel, Inc. 123 Utah 229 
257 P . 2d 950 (1953). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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CONCLUSION 
Inasmuch as this is no showing of waiver the pur curium 
decision of the United States Supreme Court requires that the 
Amended Complaint must be dismissed. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
McKay, Burton, McMurray & 
Thurman 
COLE & DEITZ 
of Counsel 
Barr ie G. McKay and William 
Thomas Thurman, Attorneys 
for Defendant-Appellant 
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